Introduction
In an earlier paper 1 I tried to describe and analyze the development of the phenomenon of controlled mobilization of peasants -to be defined later -at the regional level, taking as a case the state of Tlaxcala, Central Mexico. In that article I focussed on the intentions of regional power holders to compete with federal interests in mobilizing and organizing peasants between 1930 and 1940. This period was marked by the development of highly differentiated and often clashing interests in peasant mobilization, due to the gradual incorporation of regional political machines in a national revolutionary party under presidential control -the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) -and the power struggle between President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) and General Plutarco Elias Calles, the strongman during the preceding decade (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) . Last but not least peasant mobilization was promoted by Cárdenas commitment to combine an active landreform policy with the object of giving his government an efficient popular basis. In discussing competitive mobilization attempts I gave some attention to the careers of political leaders on the regional level who tried to generate and control political mobilization of peasants and the impact of these attempts on peasants' own strivings for land and better social conditions.
In this article I want to probe more profoundly into the phenomenon of controlled mobilization of peasants during this period, approaching it from the local level by presenting a case study of attempts at peasant mobilization by a group of local politicians who tried to control the electoral and organizational potential of, especially, landless peasants in the hacienda region of Huamantla, Tlaxcala. Since I intend to depart from the same theoretical framework as in my paper earlier mentioned, I shall start with summarizing my assumptions as to the emergence of certain characteristics of political mobilization of peasants in Latin America, their possible roots in nineteenth century caudillaje and rural powerdomains 2 , and the persistence of some of these characteristics in modern Latin America. I shall pay special attention to the emergence of new intermediaries tending to exclusivism and control over political mobilization of peasants. After presenting my theoretical argument and a sketch of the highland region of Huamantla, I intend to describe how especially one member of this group of local politicians was able to create a peasant clientele system by presenting himself as a reform intermediary to landless peasants, a category which was about to benefit from extended landreform legislation. After discussing the formative years of this peasant clientele (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) and its further extension and consolidation during the heydays of agrarian reform (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) , I shall give attention to the maintenance problems of a peasant clientele which, meanwhile, had become the focus of competitive attempts at peasant mobilization by various state and federal level interests.
I opted for a definition of peasants, which stresses as one of their main characteristics fundamental powerlessness and, by the same taken, domination by controlling outsiders: non-peasants who have obtained decisive control on peasants' political and economic actions 3 . This situation of fundamental powerlessness has significant consequences for mobilization of peasants, "the process whereby social units, whether individuals or groups, are led to expend an amount, and sometimes a large amount, of the resources at their disposal: time, money, energy, enthusiasm, in order to attain a goal which they share with other units" 4 .
In this situation it is highly unlikely that peasants will be able to attain of their own accord a goal which implies a significant rise in their low political and economic status. Peasants need allies and the crucial problem does not seem to be how to enlist allies, but how to prevent the alliance from becoming a situation of dominance by non-peasant allies over their peasant counterparts. The latter ones often tend to accept a subordinate position in return for promises of agrarian reform or other favours. As long as there are no competitors around who aspire to or might even secure, the position of controlling outsider, one may assume that external leaders or allies may let down peasants without any losing face. In situations of power struggle and major political crises, however, these allies or external leaders need not only to be sure of the peasants' support or at least their acquiescence, but they also have to prevent intrusion by aliens, possible powercontenders who might be interested in mobilizing peasants for their own political purposes. Those who control the peasantry may then react in several ways. They can use force or coercion in order to prevent or suppress undesired attempts at mobilization, but they might also take action in a different way which I would like to define as controlled mobilization of peasants: because of their position of dominance, external leaders can exert decisive influence on present and future investment of peasants' resources. This situation enables them e.g. to initiate or take over processes of political mobilization of peasants and maintain a degree of control regarding the goals to be pursued and the resources to be invested. In doing so competitors may be, at least temporarily, prevented from gaining access to these peasants' resources for political mobilization.
As Stavenhagen and Singelmann have indicated, the goals of these external leaders may be complementary to the interests of the peasants, but not necessarily so s . We have to distinguish, therefore, between varieties of controlled mobilization of peasants according to the degree in which goals of external leaders coincide with peasants' interests. When peasants obtain some results, in return for their investment of resources in the pursuit of mainly non-peasant political goals under conditions of controlled mobilization, the relationship may be fairly satisfactory in the eyes of the peasants and can probably be defined as "clientelisi" in character*.
As an opposite extreme we find the situation of more or less imposed mobilization, where external leadership forces peasants to invest resources and participate in the pursuit of political goals alien to their interests or completely beyond their horizon. Peasants may be induced to accept this situation out of fear to lose the small resources they still have at their disposal, fear of punishment or hope for some favours in the future.
As to the historical roots I stressed the possibility that caudillaje, caudillo competition and rule 7 in nineteenth century Latin America may have pro-vided a well-nigh classical model for controlled political mobilization of peasants based on force, imposition by strong-men or the deliberate creation of a peasant following by competing caudillos fostering rising expectations among peasants. In the nineteenth century the power of Latin American elites was still largely based on land and social control over the peasantry was, in terms of Charles W. Anderson, considered a strategic power capability 8 . As a consequence, local power domains based on control of land and human resources were considered as indispensable bases for the countless civil wars and power struggles which marked the process of political organization of Latin American societies in centralized political systems 9 .
Recent studies of the phenomenon of peasant mobilization seem to indicate a certain persistence of important characteristics of this classical model of controlled political mobilization in modern Latin America. The development of the modern state and diminishing rural isolation have seriously affected the power domains of landlords and caciques 10 but this process of change does not seem to have resulted in a significant power shift in favour of the peasants. In the struggle for control over the political and economic resources of the countryside a new category of leaders has emerged. They often derive from urban (lower) middle class origin, and managed to become what W a g 1 e y called new intermediaries 11 . In competition, these intermediaries claim the organizational, electoral or armed potential of peasants, which then is offered as a power capability to politicians within and without the government in exchange for certain favours for their peasants, such as land grants, credit, educational or social services 12 . It is important to note that these intermediaries may tend to exclusivism as soon as their poisition is consolidated. Studies on modern peasant organization show tendencies among politicians at various levels to acquire or retain a more or less exclu-sive control on regional sectors of peasantries 13 . Not only with regard to possible mobilization for political purposes but also to make sure that peasants, and particularly their leaders, stay in quiescent agreement with the intentions of the intermediary's political patron on the regional or the national level 14 . In other words, to prevent the development of peasant pressure groups who cannot be effectively controlled. As a consequence, political leaders in power often tended to entrust only loyal clients with the task of generating and controlling the electoral or organizational potential of peasants. They arrange the election or imposition of loyal peasantleadership (charrismo) and may use co-optation, coercion or threats to withhold favours in order to maintain control on the peasant's potential for mobilization 15 .
Favourable conditions for attempts at controlled political mobilization of peasants may be found in those situations where peasants show a persistent and urgent motivation for mobilization "from below", while nonpeasant political leaders in the process of consolidating their positions remain in need of various forms of peasant support. Mexico is probably the first Latin American country where these conditions developed on a wider scale and during a prolonged period of time, between 1910 and 1940 . The Mexican Revolution (1910 -1917 stressed the importance of control over peasants as a strategic power capability when revolutionary caudillos tried to mobilize armed followings and soon found out that this process could be accelerated significantly when peasants' griefs and claims were taken into serious consideration. The enormous impact of Emiliano Zapata's peasant movement, which effectively remedied peasant grievances in an extensive geographical area, forced his adversary Venustiano Carranza to issue a decree on land reform (1915) . This decree became the basis of a national agrarian legislation after final victory of Carranza's Constitutionalist Movement. Legal recognition of one of their most deep-rooted desires, access to land, must have been a major incentive for peasants to mobilize themselves in order to obtain land. Moreover, their motivation was to be continuously strengthened in the years after the Revolution. Although slow and restrictive in character, the gradual implementation of land reform must have had an enormous demonstration effect on peasant communities, inciting them to organize the legally required executive agrarian committee, send a petition for a landgrant to the governor of their state and, meanwhile, mobilize forces against retaliating landlords 16 . Every petition, however, had to be screened by the Comisión Locai Agraria (CLA) -from 1934 onwards the Comisión Agraria Mixta (CAM) -a state level advisory body reporting to the governor on the merits of every petition. The governor was empowered to take a provisional decision and put the peasants in provisional possession of the expropriated lands, the ejidos. The governor's decision had to be checked by the Federal Comisión Nacional Agraria in Mexico City -later the Departmento Agrario (DA) -, before the President of the Republic was to take the final decision 17 . As a consequence the administrative procedures to be followed were often complex and time-consuming, leaving petitioning committees in uncertainty for years and at the mercy of local landlords, or administrators. After ejidos had been granted to a peasant community, they had to be governed by a Comisariado ejidal, a committee elected by the ejidatarios, the peasants who had received ejidos. This committee was empowered, among others, to enforce proper cultivation of plots by ejidatarios and reallocate vacant plots. Ambitious politicians soon realized the significance of the land reform issue and its potential to ensure the loyalty of ejidatarios, peasant committees with pending petitions and those who still had to present their petitions 18 .
Up to the nineteen thirties, however, there were still large sectors of the Mexican peasantry who could not be considered suitable prospective clienteles for politicians looking for electoral and organizational support. Especially the landless labourers residing on the estates lagged far behind in their chances to profit from the benefits of the agrarian legislation. Up to the nineteen thirties they virtually lacked facilities to obtain ejidos. With the promulgation of the Código Agrario (1934) the situation changed, but even then the acasillados, the resident labourers dependent on the owner of the estate for housing and work, still were not entitled to present a petition for a land-grant on their own. They were allowed to join the census of neighbouring villages who had presented petitions for land-grants or happened to have vacant ejido-plots. In densely populated Central Mexico, however, villages often resisted the idea of permitting neighbours into their census and vacant ejido-plots were rare. In fact, the only alternative left to acasillados was asking for a Nuevo Centro de Población Agrícola, a new agricultural colony to be founded elsewhere. Although this type of a land-grant had already been stipulated in the 1917 Constitution, a more detailed arrangement appeared for the first time in the Código of 1934 and even by 1940 it had never been granted to any of the peasant communities in the area of this case study. Only from 1937 onwards all communities or poblados of resident labourers were fully entitled to present petitions for land-grants on their own 19 . Moreover, labour conditions on the estates remained extremely bad, even after the promulgation of the Federal Labour Law (1931) which met with fierce resistence in rural areas and was only slowly implemented on important issues as the 8 hour work day, the minimum wage, payments of extra work and the right to join or found syndicates 10 .
Between 1934 and 1940, however, the situation changed significantly. Progressive implementatiori of extended land reform and labour legislation, and intensive competitive attempts by federal and state level interest groups to mobilize and control the peasants' electoral and organizational potential affected the hitherto relatively exclusive power domains of landlords and regional caciques. They had to compete with new power contenders attract' ed by the likelihood that rural labourers were now to receive the benefits of agrarian and labour legislation 21 . The combined processes of political and social change involved will be illustrated in the following case study of the hacienda region around the town of Huamantla in the eastern part of the Central Mexican state of Tlaxcala. After a short introduction on this district and its agrarian history I shall describe the rural social situation around 1930 and then follow the process of peasant clientele formation during the high tide of agrarian reform (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) Although the Armed Revolution (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) temporarily affected estate owners -some properties of known enemies of the Revolution were placed under embargo by the provisional Constitutionalist government in 1914 -the area was only slightly affected by land reform until many years after the Revolution. During the presidencies of Obregón and Calles (1920-1928) The larger and medium sized estates on the plains and the slopes of the Malintzi all had a more or less permanent population of resident labourers who had often been born on the hacienda and lived with their families in mud huts provided for by the owner. The total population of workers, foremen, overseers, administrators and their families on all the haciendas and ranchos of the municipality of Huamantla was about 4500 in 1921, and it declined to about 4000 in 1930 after the first estates had been affected by expropriation. The number of workers per hacienda could vary considerably, but a medium sized estate like San Diego Meca (1463 ha) around 1930 had a permanent population of about 50 workers, with their families totaling about 200. Although labour conditions varied somewhat, they were invariably bad. Workdays of ten hours or more were normal, salaries varied between 35 and 60 cts. for common rural workers and payments in kind (maize) were often deduced.
For the many hundreds of poor Huamantlaco town peasants the situation was equally desperate. With most of the agricultural land around town in the hands of landowners or rich peasants -La Compañía of the Bretón family extended up to the last street of the town -they had practically no plots of their own and were forced to work on estates, earning only slightly more than resident labourers. Others worked as peones, landless labourers, on the lands of rich Huamantlaco peasants who had been able to claim large plots of formerly communal lands. Labour conditions there seem to have been even worse than on haciendas. Salaries were lower, often in kind and sharecropping arrangements were refused. The probably least desired alternative for making a living was to be recruited by the hated enganchadores for seasonal labour on tropical estates in Puebla, Oaxaca or Vera Cruz.
As a commercial center and residence of landlords Huamantla had steadily declined in the years after the Revolution. Hacienda stores tended to be supplied from larger firms in nearby Puebla or Mexico City and a number of landlords preferred to live in the big cities, using their Huamantla residence only for short visits. Nevertheless, when the movement for land reform, the Agrarista movement, started in Huamantla at the beginning of the nineteen twenties, the town was still under strict control of landowning families and rich peasants. The municipal president was a member of the Rivera family mentioned earlier and, like most rich peasants of Huamantla, a declared enemy of the Agrarista movement. Moreover, as the delegate of the National Agrarian Commission wrote in a 1927 report on Huamantla, "los campesinos aún inclinan la cabeza para saludar a los hacendados ", while at that time the landowners in the Atoyac valley of southern Tlaxcala, barely 50 kms away, did not even dare to enter some peasant villages known for strong Agrarista leadership 24 .
It would however be erroneous to assume a complete lack of mobilization "from below" among the resident labourers of Huamantla. The Agrarista movement in the town of Huamantla and neighbouring villages like Ixtenco, Citlaltepetl, Teacalco, Tocatlan and others must have been well known, because they all obtained ejidos between 1920 and 1930. Together with Agrarista initiatives sponsored by the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the Liga Nacional Campesina (LNC) and individual activities of local Agrarista clerks and schoolteachers, the movement in the town and the neighbouring villages must have stirred the resident labourers, as is proved by various petitions for land presented many years before resident labourers were legally entitled to ask for a land-grant 15 . Mounting Agrarismo and the possible threats of expropriations in favour of Huamantla town and the villages induced most landlords to early fraccionamientos, the often simulated repartition of their estates in smaller properties among family members or partners. By 1930 nearly all the estates apparently had been divided in this way".
The first major moment in the Agrarista movement of Huamantla was the land-grant donated by President Calles to the town of Huamantla in 1928 . Governor Ignacio Mendoza (1925 -1929 had refused a land-grant to the executive agrarian committee of Huamantla and his government party had done its best to harrass the Agraristas of Huamantla. After five years of hardship for the Agraristas President Calles overruled the governor and three important estates around town, Soltepec, Guadalupe and Compañía lost together 2292 has. The establishment of the first ejidos in Huamantla provoked fierce Agrarista fervor among the resident labourers and the executive agrarian committee of the town received numerous petitions to aid the acasillados. The landlords reacted by threatening the Huamantla committee, which asked the federal government for arms to defend itself against the landlords. The atmosphere grew even more tense when the Federal Labour Law was promulgated (1931) and the first syndicates were organized on local haciendas. Landlords and administrators retaliated by evicting unionized labourers or picking them for heavy duties 27 .
For the time being, however, landlords were to remain in control of the area. They had been able to cultivate friendly relations with a group of politicians around the powerful former governor Ignacio Mendoza, who had been able to cause one of his trusted aides, Adrián Vásquez Sánchez, to be elected his successor for the 1929-1933 governor's term. As I pointed out in my earlier paper, Mendoza may be considered as a cacique who succeeded in maintaining control of the state government, supported by the CROM and a number of regional interests brought together within his government party. Mendoza took Garrido Canabal, the strongman of the state of Tabasco, as his model and he reorganized the government party into a Partido Socialista on the Tabasco model, although he never equalled the control Canabal could exercise over his state of Tabasco. For more than ten years the State Congress, municipal presidencies and councils, the state bureaucracy and even minor clerical posts, were fully controlled by the Socialista clique, supported in some districts by considerable landowners' interests. In the electoral district of Juárez (Huamantla and surrounding municipalities) Fernando Carvajal, an influential Humantlaco, was the trusted aide of the governors Mendoza and Vásquez. Carvajal represented his district in the State Congress for ten years (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) and rigidly controlled the municipal councils for the Socialista party. After 1930, however, the Socialistas in Tlaxcala began to lose federal support and in 1932 opposition groups succeeded in preventing the election of yet another Socialista governor. A relatively unknown politician, Adolfo Bonilla, succeeded in obtaining the support of the PNR and was elected governor after fierce resistance of the Socialistas. Bonilla started an immediate and thorough purge of Socialistas. Most of them lost their executive or legislative positions and their clients in the state bureaucracy were dismissed. One of the major arguments in stigmatizing the Socialistas had been their complete lack of interest in land reform. Bonilla and hisPartidoReconstructor AntireeleccionistaTìaxcalteca (PRAT) had done their best to use this argument in hacienda districts like Huamantla. Here Mendoza had consistently refused any land-grants, while Vás-ASRA 5042 DT. 489 cit.; DT 326 Certificado Pdte, Mpal. = presidente municipal, Huamantla, 27. 12.1926; DT 247 Del. CNA. Tlax. to CNA, México, 18. 11. 1926; Del. CNA. Tlax. to OM CNA, México, 8. 4. 1927; CPA, Huamantla, to Vocal Ponente CNA, México, 23. 11. 1929; DT 689 CPA, Huamantla, to OM CNA, México, 25. 11. 1929; Carr.: Acta fundación sindicato "Vcnustiano Carranza", Pinar. 11. 2. 1932. quez had mainly favoured the small holder villages of his own constituency. Bonilla's 1932 campaign, the PNR-sponsored campaign to bring Lázaro Cárdenas into the presidency of the Republic (1933-34) and the promulgation of the Agrarian Code (1934) which entitled more peasants to ask for land, induced more than a hundred Tlaxcalan peasant committees into presenting petitions for land during the first two years of Bonilla's term (1933) (1934) ".
The formative years of a peasant clientele in Huamantla (1933 Huamantla ( -1936 As elsewhere in Tlaxcala, the ousting of the deputy, municipal presidents, councillors and minor officials created sudden prospects for political mobility in Huamantla and attracted job seekers, partly from out of state. Among the young politicians who followed local opposition to the Socialista regime and tried to find a place in the hierarchy of the new governor, were Felipe Mazarrasa, Emilio Carvajal jr. and Rubén C. Carrizosa. Mazarrasa and Carvajal were members of prestigeous local families, the former from a landed family of Spanish origin, the latter being the heir of a family of Huamantlaco politicians. The third one, Carrizosa, had not been bom in Tlaxcala nor lived there before. He came from the state of Oaxaca, where he had served as an officer in the Conventionist Armies during the Revolution. Between 1920 and 1932 he held various modest positions in the judicial branch of the Puebla state bureaucracy and in 1933 he followed Bonilla to Tlaxcala on recommendation of his superior, a friend of Bonilla 29 . After coming to Huamantla he rapidly succeeded in becoming one of young Mazarrasa's trusted aides, the indispensable third man in a triumvirate which, as we shall see, succeeded in dominating Humantlaco politics for years.
Carrizosa worked hard in organizing the extraordinary elections for deputies, municipal presidents and counsellors -called in order to fill the vacancies left by oustedSocialistas. Mazarassa was elected municipal president of Huamantla, july 1933, played a leading role in organizing the local branch of Bonilla's PRAT, the Gran Partido Obrero-Campesino del Distrito de Juárez and joined the State PNR leadership. Meanwhile Carrizosa had been appointed municipal secretary to Mazarrasa and became one of the main political activists of the Gran Partido, visiting numerous haciendas and villages in the district in order to found Bonillista clubs and committees. By that time Bonilla needed all the support he could get, because the ousted Socialistas not only tried to incriminate the new governor, accusing him of unjustified dismissals, extortions and even murders, but also tried to compete with Bonilla's political friends in controlling the PNR-sponsored electoral campaign to bring Cárdenas into the presidency. Mazarrasa and Carrizosa did their utmost to keep the Cárdenas campaign in Huamantla out of oppositional hands and after Bonilla had been cleared by a federal Senate Committee, Carrizosa organised a succesful campaign to have Mazarrasa elected as deputy to the State Congress for the 1935-1937 term 30 . In the spring of 1935 the competitive efforts of Bomilistas and their political enemies to control the electoral and organizational potential of Tlaxcalan peasants ended in open conflict, when Graciano Sánchez and governor Bonilla disagreed on the terms Tor founding a Tlaxcalan peasant league. Graciano Sánchez, leader of the Confederación Campesina Mexicana (CCM), a peasant organisation which had strongly supported the election of Cárdenas, wanted to create a strong national organization and disliked the idea of a state liga controlled by the governor. Bonilla made it clear, however, that he would refuse to have any of his political enemies in control of the organization and when Sánchez refused to give in, Bonilla organized his own peasant league, the Confederación de Campesinos y Agraristas de Tlaxcala, putting his own political machine and the state bureaucracy behind the effort. Graciano Sánchez lost no time in founding a counter-organization, headed in part by former Socialistas. In the district of Juárez Carrizosa and one of his aides, Filemón Daza, immediately organized the local branch of the Bonilla Confederación. Membership was made compulsory in order to offset any initiatives by local schoolteacher Guadalupe León, a Gracianosanchista, who had been appointed on the committee of the counterorganization adhered to the C.C.M. 31 First of all an ambitious local politician who wants to become a successful intermediary has to make sure that peasants regard their relationship with him as fairly satisfactory. If an intermediary happens to have "the law on his side" as far as the wishes of his peasant clients are concerned, possibilities for establishing satisfactory relations may be better, but even then he still has to look for strategic relationships with power holders in the superior levels of state and federal bureaucracy which may be able to procure the favours he needs for "his" peasants in return for their electoral and organizational support.
As far as the law is concerned, the Federal Labour Law and the new Agrarian Code not only had created more favourable conditions for peasant action but also for prospective agrarian intermediaries. Regulations concerning the 8-hour workday, the minimum wage or the right to join or found syndicates could be used in political mobilization campaigns, inducing peasants to ask for implementation of the law and to bring their complaints before the Junta Municipal de Conciliación, the local arbitration board for labour disputes (hereafter referred to as Junta municipal). In 1933-34 minimum wage regulations were a national political issue. At the same time the new Agrarian Code brought more categories of landless labourers within the reach of land reform, but poblados or hamlets of resident labourers still had to prove a minimum level of independent existence before they were allowed to present a petition for a land-grant on their own. To many peasant leaders, however, the complexities of the agrarian and labour legislation remained unclear and they needed more advice than ever before 32 .
zosa, Huamantla, 2. 7. 1935; telegrama Filemón Daza, Huamantla, to Pdte. Cárdenas, México, 11. 7.1935; Interviews Carrizosa, aprii 1968. 32 ) The Federal Labour Law authorized municipal councils to appoint a Junta Mpal de Conciliación, composed of an equal number of representatives of the complaining workers and the accused owners or administrators of the estates, a municipal representative and a secretary. Since landlords often refused to appear, let alone to conciliate, many cases had to be remitted to the state level Junta Central. As a result procedures were often timeconsuming. If a landlord refused to submit the dispute to arbitration or to accept the decision by the State board, he could be forced to indemnify his workers. -See on the functioning of the Junta Mpal and JCCyA, minimum wage regulations and sindical organization Ley Federal del Trabajo (1931) , arts.
Within a year after arriving in Huamantla Carrizosa had been able to create a combination of suitable positions for a prospective agrarian intermediary. As municipal secretary he succeeded in becoming special Labour inspector for Huamantla and secretary of the Junta municipal. Moreover, as manager of various ad hoc political groups and member of the municipal PNR committee he became one of the indispensable intermediaries for anyone wanting to see deputy Mazarrasa or governor Bonilla. Among them we do not only find ejidatarios or petitioning peasants, but also owners-fraccionistas 33 , village authorities and even administrators of estates. Equally important was Carrizosa's managership of a local newspaper which served for many years as a political platform for his friends and as a voice for problems of "his" peasants 34 .
At first sight, the local situation around Huamantla seemed favourable for ambituous politicians offering themselves as prospective intermediaries to peasants who became more and more aware of the institutional and legal possibilities facilitating the implementation of their constitutional rights. Carrizosa and Mazarrasa, however, had to cope with a political patron who, apart from his initial promises during the election campaign for governor (1932) does not seem to have had any agrarista convictions of his own. Bonilla showed only scant interest in land reform and adhered strictly to the restrictive land reform policy characteristic of the Maximoto. Although he used to spice his adresses with allusions to land reform and to dwell in his annual reports upon labour conditions, he did not perform anything substantial in either field. Bonilla received more than one hundred petitions for land-grants in the first two years of his term (1933) (1934) , but he settled only three of them, the others remained to be studied by the notoriously sluggish CAM of ΉΒΧΟβΙβ, or were denied. A similar fate was in store for the hundreds of petitions and complaints adressed to the Confederación. After the first few months Bonilla lost interest in promoting them and his official peasant organization never prospered 35 . As to labour disputes and freedom of unionization, the resident labourers on Huamantla haciendas soon discovered that the Junta Municipal de Conciliación had no power. Landlords often refused to send representatives to its hearings and preferred the disputes to be pursued interminably before the Junta Central de Conciliación y Arbitraje in Tlaxcala capital. In the eyes of the peasants the Junta Central often decided in favour of landlords or not at all 36 . Since Carrizosa was the man who operated at the grassrootsDeputy Mazarrasa mostly residing out of town -he was quite often pressed by his peasant clients "from below" but in many cases seemed unable to do much about their complaints. First of all, as pointed out before, young Mazarrasa had a landowners background and Carvajal jr. was a lawyer who now and again represented owners in labour disputes 37 .
A second reason why Carrizosa apparently was unable to pursue thoroughly the institutional and legal facilities to intervene on behalf of his peasants has to do with the composition of his clientele. As mentioned before, it did not only cover a peasantry -itself divided in various antagonistic interest groups -, but also a number of non-peasant individual or group interests often conflicting with those of peasants. To give a few examples, Carrizosa now and again needed the support of hacienda administrators who had to give permission to peasants for attending a political meeting in town or even to take them there on the truck of the hacienda; fraccionistas who had bought a small or medium-sized plot from an estateowner wanted to make sure that their newly acquired properties could not be affected by land reform ; vested interests of Comisariados ejidales in the existing distribution of e//rfo-plots often conflicted with those of a growing number of landless peasants. Finally, the interests of ejidatarios and landless peasants in the town of Huamantla tended to conflict with the claims of resident labourers on neighbouring estates. As was to be expected, local opposition tried to bring down Carrizosa and his friends by pinpointing the antagonistic interests of their clientele and accusing them of making the best of both worlds 38 . Let us give a few examples from the 1933-1936 period in order to illustrate how intensive political mobilization, manipulating peasants' constitutional rights, often succeeded in generating labour -and agrarista action among the landless labourers. The generating intermediary then had to compromise on the interests of some clients in view of mounting opposition of others, or on account of legal or bureaucratic obstacles. At the same time he had to make sure not to lose disappointed clients to his political enemies.
Attempts to organize resident labourers had already been made under the Socialistas after the Federal Labour Law had been issued. Governor Vasquez' government party started to unionize resident labourers at some haciendas during the 1932 electoral campaign. As a result of this a syndicate was founded on the estate San Diego Pinar, one of the estates owned by the Rivera family, south of Huamantla 39 .
With the fall of the Socialistas the administrator and the new municipal authorities threatened the leaders of this socialista syndicate. Some of them were arrested and others evicted. The Pinar syndicate succeeded, however, in staying afloat, supported by the local schoolteacher of the hacienda, Guadelupe León, and the headmaster of the village school of Citlaltepetl, Hipólito Reyes Victoria. cisión on their petition. He was succesful: in March 1935 Bonilla granted the labourers of Soltepec about a 1000 ha, the first and for the time being, only grant to resident labourers around Huamantla 44 .
As the growing number of petitions between 1933 and 1936 failed to be resolved by the Tlaxcalan C.A.M., impatience and frustration among local peasant leaders mounted, especially since the landlords consistently refused to comply with federal labour regulations which had been distributed among hacienda workers during the electoral campaigns of 1933 and 1934. In 1933 the Tlaxcalan Junta Central, following President Abelardo Rodríguez' national campaign to implement the call for a minimum wage established in the Federal Labour Law, issued a decree fixing the minimum wage for the municipality of Huamantla at one peso a day. Nearly all the landlords refused to obey and in 1934 a committee of Huamantlaco landlords tried to have the decree revoked, alleging that the local authorities in Huamantla had already agreed to fix the daily wages for rural workers living in the town at 65 cts. and those of resident labourers at 60 cts. Municipal president Mazarrasa and secretary Carrizosa kept, what may be described as a low profile, sending the landlords' petition to the Junta Central without comment. Rural labour leaders were incensed not only because of the action of the landlords and the fact that even this low daily wage was often not paid, but also because of the disappointing attitude of local authorities. Syndicate leaders of five haciendas, headed by the ones of Pinar and some of them organized by Carrizosa, now decided to bypass municipal and state level authorities, asking the federal Department of Labour, the PNR and the new President Cárdenas for help. An investigation was ordered and in April 1935 on a meeting at the municipality of Huamantla the landlords, represented by Alfredo Bretón, reluctantly agreed to a compromise worked out by Mazarrasa and Carrizosa. The resident labourers would continue to receive 60 cts. in cash but were to be entitled to 40 cts. of value in kind: 25 1 of maize each week, a small garden, free water, firewood and grazing rights. Still quite a number of administrators refused to comply and a growing number of peones went to the Junta municipal. Carrizosa, who had cleverly waited for the federal push to a more vigorous implementation of labour legislation now tried to reap the harvest. He aided peones of the estates of Xonecuila, Tecoac, Sta. Bárbara, Soltepec, La Natividad, Mier and Pinar in presenting their claims before the Junta municipal**.
While the cases were dragging on labour relations on haciendas deteriorated as administrators took reprisals. Resident labourers who had been members or leaders of a local union were evicted or selected for especially heavy or dirty work such as cleaning ditches. Local agrarista schoolteachers who had offered to represent the peones at the hearings of the Junta municipal were confronted with attempts of the landlords to have them removed 46 .
At the beginning of 1935, after municipal president Mazarrasa had been elected deputy to the State Congress -Carrizosa staying on as municipal secretary -dashed hopes and irritability prevailed among the leaders of rural syndicates and members of executive agrarian committees. Their opinion was well described by the president of the local branch of the L.N.C, and a number of town peasants in a letter to the new President Cár-denas: after all the promises during the electoral campaigns nothing had changed yet. The C.A.M. was as slow and cumbersome as ever and needed badly to be changed or else the petitions of villagers and resident labourers should be sent straight to the D.A. in Mexico City. Moreover, local syndicate leaders were convinced that the Junta Central continued to side with the landlords 47 .
A year later still nothing had changed, at least not in the eyes of the peasants. Only one executive agrarian committee had received land (Soltepec) and labour disputes still remained unsolved, but competitive mobilization of the local peasantries went on. Carrizosa and Filemón Daza, the local leader of Bonilla's Confederación, tried to curb the influence of the Gracianosanchista leader Guadalupe León, who for years had supported the resi-45 ) Col Carrizosa, Huamantla, 10. 9. 1936. dent labourers of hacienda Pinar. Their syndicate was among the most prestigeóus of the district. It played a leading role in the conflict on the minimum wage regulation (1934-35) earlier referred to and in the regional organization of resident labourers in the Unión de Sindicatos y Peones de Juárez. Carrizosa and his friends tried to undermine the CCM orientation of the Pinar syndicate by giving special attention to complaints of resident labourers on Pinar and on haciendas who had cooperated with Pinar. To judge from the ample correspondence (1935) (1936) between Carrizosa, the local Pinar syndicate leader Ignacio García and head master Hipólito Reyes V., one may assume that Carrizosa and Mazarrasa must have devoted quite some time to the land and labour problems of Pinar, which were caused by repeated dismissals, extortion and eviction of unionized and agrarista peones. In October 1935 the syndicate was reorganized and a new directiva had to be elected because a number of peones had left the hacienda. However, Carrizosa still could not bring this syndicate to join Bonilla's Confederación. This did happen, however, on the neighbouring estate of Mier. The administrator had dismissed a number of workers after the 1935 harvest and they asked Carrizosa for help, Carrizosa founded a Confederación syndicate and the resident labourers got all possible attention regarding their labour problems, Carrizosa inspecting the hacienda while the Confederación presented the complaints straight to the Junta Central in Tlaxcala 48 .
The resident labourers of hacienda Tecoac were aided by the Confederación in presenting a petition for a land-grant, since their 1934 petition for an agricultural colony apparently could not prosper. Whatever the efforts of the Confederación in the summer of 1935 -workers at Sta. Bàrbara were aided in presenting complaints before the Junta municipal and those of Los Pilares in presenting a petition for a land-grant 49 -for the time being the results were negligible. As Cárdenas' progressive agrarian policy began to take shape in mid-1936, impatience among petitioning peasants in Huamantla mounted. Moreover, the agricultural cycle one more neared its end and the land had to be prepared for new crops 50 . In Huamantla a group of dissatisfied peasant leaders guided by agrarista schoolteachers founded an 48 How did he succeed, given the disappointment and irritation among peasant leaders during the first half of 1936? Carrizosa's political programme as a deputy-to-be did not differ very much from other politicians of that time adapting themselves at least verbally to the reformist Leitmotiv of the Cardenista period. Like the programmes of his competitors it pinpointed some of the hot issues in the district: unification and organization of the peasantry, land reform, labour inspection on haciendas, the problem of unequal distribution of ejido-plots and lack of educational facilities on haciendas* 7 . More important in fortifying his peasant basis may have been a change in governor Bonilla's habitual disinterest in landreform matters and, secondly, a successful political strategy in securing the allegiance of peasant clients at the very moment when prospects for the implementation of land reform and labour inspection became actually brighter, due to the vigorous policy of the federal government.
During the crucial months of this electoral campaign between August and November 1936 Bonilla suddenly resolved four pending petitions, granting more than 3500 ha to landless peasants of Huamantla town, the village of Tocatlan, the ranchería Los Pilares and hacienda Tecoac. Whatever the reasons for doing so -electoral motives and Cárdenas' policy of forcing the hands of governors in order to speed up landreform -the momentum was tremendous, especially when governor Bonilla came to Huamantla in order to transfer the land to the peasants during a widely publicized political meeting. Landlords acted in reprisal and started to dismiss resident labourers, also on non-affected haciendas like Pinar, Sta. Bárbara, La Natividad and Xalpatlahuaya. Hipólito Reyes V., the head master earlier mentioned of Citlaltepetl warned Carrizosa against what he thought to be a planned intimidation campaign by landlords, Carrizosa used the item cleverly in his campaign speeches, promising to promote better job security for resident labourers* 8 . During these months of political fervour, labour unrest and some spectacular results in landreform Carrizosa seems to have been quite successful in maintaining existing clients and gaining new ones. By october 1936 Carrizosa had the support of the local branch of the Confederación (Filemón Daza), the Unión de sindicatos y peones de Juárez (Ignacio García), agrarian committees of Huamantla and the neighbouring villages of Ixtenco, Citlaltepetl and El Carmen. Finally he could count on a number of executive agrarian committees of haciendas and syndicates with pending disputes, the more important ones being those of Batán and Pinar® 9 . This implies that Carrizosa and his friends must have been able to solve some important problems of local control. Quite illustrative was the fact that he succeeded in obtaining, at least temporarily, control over the important worker's syndicate of Pinar, which had always had a leading role in unionizing peones. During several months, head master Reyes V. had continued to '·) Relación de poblados cit.; Reyes V., Citlaltepetl, to Carrizosa, Huamantla, 10. 9. 1936; interviews Carrizosa, march 1968. 59) Some examples from Huamantla: Batán, pending petition for a landgrant since 1933, Balcón since 1934, Soltepec, pending petition for extension oí ejidos 1936, Sta. Bárbara and Ranchería Jesús presented petitions during the autumn 1936 electoral campaign. Petitions and manifestos earlier cited show another dozen of agrarian committees in surrounding municipalities of the 7th electoral district, in Col. Carr. ask Carrizosa's support for the Pinar workers who were still awaiting a decision on their petition for an agricultural colony presented in june 1935. Moreover, the owner Rivera had repeatedly dismissed unionized peones and in the eyes of the peasants the Junta Central simply refused to pay any real attention to their complaints. At the end of august 1936 Carrizosa visited Pinar, founded a new syndicate "Lázaro Cárdenas" and once more promised the workers to support their claims. By now, late 1936, Carrizosa seemed quite successful. Already in January 1937 the Junta Central forced owner Rivera to pay the long overdue indemnification to dismissed peones. Carrizosa advised the resident labourers to present a petition for a land-grant to the new governor Cándia who, indeed, resolved the case within a year granting the landless labourers of Pinar nearly 500 ha 60 .
A second maintenance problem regarding their local power domain Carrizosa and Mazarrasa were able to solve in the autumn of 1936 was that of controlling the important Comisariado e/idal of Huamantla town. As referred to before, Carrizosa and Mazarrasa had succeeded in 1934 in founding an "independent'' executive agrarian committee in order to keep the initiative in advocating an extension of ejidos out of the hands of Felix C. Rodriguez and "his" Comisariado ejidal. For two years (1934) (1935) (1936) ) the committees were in a virtual state of war, the executive agrarian committee, backed by Bonilla's Confederación, and its federal ally the LNC, while the "Rodriguista" Comisariado ejidal had the support of Graciano Sánchez' C.C .M. Mazarrasa and Carrizosa accused Rodriguez of deliberately delaying the procedure for extension of ejidos in order to maintain his control over the Comisariado ejidal -in case of an additional land-grant the law required the election of a new administrative committee. On his part the Comisariado ejidal complained that the executive agrarian committee had tried to manipulate the census with intent to keep their political enemies out of the list of prospective ejidatarios.
In august 1936, the situation grew tense, because Bonilla gave Huamantla a provisional land-grant of 1260 ha. The Comisariado ejidal insisted on an independent federal inspector to oversee the distribution of the new ejido· plots, but, as mentioned earlier, Bonilla threw his weight into the battle by personally ceding the land to his political friends in Huamantla. Carrizosa hereafter managed to control the election of a new Comisariado ejidal, to be headed for the next few years by his PNR friend and campaign assistent, the recently elected deputy-councillor of Huamantla Antonio Aquino Daza 61 . In terms of legal and political opportunities for consolidating and extending a peasant clientele, the years of Carrizosa's term as deputy (1937) (1938) (1939) and party leader (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) ) constituted a major break-through. As mentioned before, pressure by the federal government of President Cárdenas and electoral motives may already have been major factors in speeding up land reform procedures in Tlaxcala during the second half of 1936. If we go by the land reform dossiers of Tlaxcalan villages and haciendas there is ample proof that the federal Cárdenas government continued to exert pressure on the state government during the years up to 1940 62 . Moreover, the year 1937 witnessed the issuing of President Cárdenas famous decree of August 9th, invalidating simulated repartition of haciendas among partners or family members and enabling all resident labourers to ask for a landgrant on their own, even those living in the main service-center of the hacienda". This decree removed two major hindrances for speeding up land reform around Huamantla. Within a year executive agrarian committees were founded by resident labourers of the haciendas San Diego Meca, San Martin Notario, Xalpatlahuaya and Buenavista. The C.A.M. of Tlaxcala was finally able to affect haciendas like San Migual Báez, San Pedro Batán, La Natividad,, San Diego Notario and others who had hitherto been able to escape expropriation by simulated repartition. As a consequence already existing e/¡'fi?o-colonies of former resident labourers now started to ask for further extension of ejidos (Ranchería de Jesús, Soltepec, Tecoac, Sta.Bárbara). By 1940 most haciendas around Huamantla had been affected by land reform, albeit sometimes only partially, and continued to be confronted with numerous additional claims for extension of ejidos 64 .
During this heyday of agrarian reform an agrarian intermediary properly investing time, energy and contacts might, so to speak, expect a substantia] harvest, but he also had to count with mounting competition while collecting the crop. Carrizosa experienced both. During his term as a deputy Carrizosa showed considerable activity in founding and coaching executive agrarian committees. Right after the Cárdenas decree of August 1937 mentioned earlier, he started to coach committees of resident labourers on the haciendas of Buenavista, San Diego Notario, San Martín Notario and San Diego Meca. Meanwhile he intervened on behalf of the existing ejidocolonies on Sta. Bárbara, Soltepec and Tecoac who wanted extension of their land-grants, and aided the perserving committees of Batán and Balcón, both of them struggling for land since Bonilla rose to power. As contrasted with former years, from 1937 onwards most of the petitioning committees were to receive a provisional land-grant from governor Cándia within a year. Within these same two years (1937) (1938) (1939) ) President Cárdenas granted approximately 5000 ha of ejidos to Huamantla town, one of its barrios and six poblados of resident labourers around the town. If we take into account the land-grants in all the neighbouring municipalities of Carrizosa's electoral district, the amount would easily come to 10.000 ha. As deputy and party leader Carrizosa cleverly rode the crest of the agrarian reform wave, being present at many acts of provisional or definite transfer of ejido lands to peasant-petitioners, sometimes together with Governor Cándia 65 .
The case of hacienda Batán is quite illustrative of the enlarged possibilities to intervene successfully on behalf of petitioning landless labourers. The committee of Batan had presented a petition for a land-grant in 1933, but the C.A.M. hesitated to push the case in view of the convincing arguments of the landlords: all the surrounding haciendas had already been divided into small properties and the resident labourers did not constitute a poblado entitled to present a petition on its own. After three years Carrizosa finally decided to intervene during the electoral campaign of autumn 1936. After he had been elected deputy, he aided the petitioning labourers in order to qualify as an independent petitioning community by helping them to acquire the legally recognized status of a colony. Immediately after the Cárdenas decree on simulated repartitions of haciendas had been issued, committee president Francisco Serrano of Batán reminded the Tlaxcalan C.A.M. of their pending petition and asked for a quick decision. During the es ) Relación de poblados cit. and Pichero estadístico cit. The appi. 5000 ha of ejidos were granted to Huamantla town, its barrio Yanquitlalpan and poblados of resident labourers on Sta. Bárbara, Tecoac, Batán, Jesús, Los Pilares and Soltepec. See in Col. Cair. corresp. and report on governor Cándia's visit to Huamantla in spring 1938.
next months Serrano and Carrizosa remained in close contact and ill january 1938 Governor Candía gave a provisional land-grant of S 20 ha to 60 resident labourers of Batán. The affected owncis-fraccionistas of the hacienda Batán and the neighbouring estate Báez complained to governor Cándia, tried to obtain a writ of injunction and started a campaign on the federal level of the bureaucracy, hoping to prevent final application of the Cárdenas decree to their properties. Carrizosa went personally to the D.A. in Mexico City with documents to prove the simulated character of the sub-divisions of the haciendas and rallied, together with Serrano, all the neighbouring committees for a joint petition to the D.A. and President Cárdenas. The ownersfraccionistas continued to contest the application of the Cárdenas decree, even after the President of the Republic had confirmed Cándia's decision in august 1938. As Comisariado ejidal Serrano remained among Carrizosa's most loyal clients. He supported him during his campaign for deputy, helped to nominate Carrizosa for state level party leadership of the PNR, and aided in the organization of political meetings during the next few years 66 . However, as we shall see later on, the distribution of ejido-plots among the local peasants was to become an issue splitting the new colony in Carrizosa clients and enemies.
By 1938 Carrizosa could easily rally a numerous peasant clientele for occasions of essentially non-peasant and rather remote purposes such as the birthday of governor Cándia; a petition to have one of his friends appointed as director of a new agricultural school; a meeting to support President Cardenas in his confrontation with foreign oil interests 67 . His peasant clientele in the district consisted of at least fifty Comisariados ejidales, executive agrarian committees and local rural syndicates. There is evidence that probably most of them continued to have serious problems to be tackled, even after they had received a land-grant or a labour dispute had been resolved satisfactorily 68 . More issues and more competition: problems in maintaining an enlarged peasant clientele (1938) (1939) (1940) The land reform wave during the years 1936-1940 covered at least 8000 ha in the municipality of Huamantla alone and implied, for that matter, a significant process of agrarian structural change 69 . The landlords' traditional position of dominance was severely challenged, for hundreds of resident labourers land reform implied an ejido-plot of their own. But for many others it probably brought more misery, as they were dismissed and evicted. As new ejidatarios founded their colonies away from the old hacienda centres and dislodged peones flocked to the town in search of a home and a job, the traditional settlement pattern changed, thereby provoking a series of disputes between long existing village interests, newly founded e/wfo-colonies and remaining owners oí haciendas on ejido-borders, problems of trespassing and of access to roads and water 70 . Moreover, as the progressive social policy of the federal Cárdenas government began to take roots on the local level the new e/i'ifo-colonies began to ask for schools, water, credit and agricultural extension services. Carrizosa was at his best while trying to solve this last type of problems. He intervened for the opening of schools in several e/n/o-colonies, obtained grants for sons of ejidatarios to attend courses on agricultural schools and finally obtained a regional agricultural school for Huamantla 71 . However, Carrizosa must have found out soon that he was unable to cope with many problems caused or intensified by the wave of land reform. Even worse, it seemed that intervention or non-intervention would equally alienate conflicting parties among his peasant clients, let alone his other clients.
Once more a telling example: Sta. Bárbara. Resident labourers of this hacienda presented a repeated petition for land during Carrizosa's electoral campaign in august 1936. Two months later, however, Bonilla gave more than 1400 ha of the hacienda Sta. Bárbara to a neighbouring village Sta. María Tocatlan. As a result many resident labourers were dismissed by the owner and the president of the executive agrarian committee of Sta. Bárba-ra, Tomás Romero, asked Carrizosa and the new governor Cándia to intervene. Cándia asked Jorge Haro, the owner of Sta. Bàrbara, to allow these peones the use of the hacienda huts and water while they were looking for work elsewhere. At the same time Carrizosa urged the village of Tocatlan to allow the dismissed workers temporary use of their new ejido pastures. In june 1937 the resident labourers of Sta. Bárbara received a land-grant of 276 ha to be taken from Santiago Brito, another property of the Haro family, and Totolquexco, an hacienda in the adjacent municipality of Tzompantepec. Part of the expropriated lands of the latter hacienda however had been bought by peasant-smallholders of the neighbouring village of San José Teacalco and they refused to admit the prospective ejidatarios of Sta. Bárbara. For months both parties hovered on the verge of a violent conflict, but in november 1937 the village of Tocatlan, which originally had received lands on Sta. Bárbara, received definitive ejidos on the adjacent hacienda San Martín Notario. Romero and Carrizosa quickly rallied the State Congres behind a petition to the D.A. proposing to give the now vacant ejido·plots on Sta. Bárbara to its own resident labourers and prevent a clash with Teacalco smallholders. This solution seemed ideal and Carrizosa wanted to solve the issue as soon as possible for at least two plausible reasons. A conflict with the peasant smallholders of Teacalco could endanger his relations with Antonio de la Lanza, his fellow deputy of the 6th district and colleague in the state PNR committee. De la Lanza had a large constituency of smallholders, those of Teacalco among them. Moreover, Graciano Sánchez had made it clear that he intended to intervene. Meanwhile President Cárdenas decided to give the ejidatarios of Sta. Bárbara ejidos on another hacienda, nearby San Miguel Báez. Romero and his ejidatarios insisted on the vacant plots on Sta. Bárbara itself. Here they had their houses and sufficient water. The D.A. refused however and the new e/j'c/o-colony had to be founded on Baez grounds, where the ejidatarios were to be harrassed by peasants from other villages on the Malintzi, claiming the ancestral use of these lands. The new ejido-colony asked Carrizosa and Cándia for arms to defend itself. It was faced, moreover, with lack of construction material for housing, lack of water and educational facilities, and severest of all deprivations, scarcity of agricultural lands. When it became clear that Carrizosa seemed unable to solve th colony's most pressing problems, part of the peasants went to Carrizosa's political enemies of the time, the recently founded Tlaxcalan state peasant League 72 .
This brings us to one of Carrizosa's major problems: How to maintain control over his peasant clientele within the virtually obligatory framework of President Cárdenas' policy to have the Mexican peasantry organized in one national organization under strict federal control. In 1937 the Comité Unificador Campesina, the PNR committee in charge of federal controlled peasant organization, initiated founding procedures for the official Tlaxcalan state peasant league, to be adhered to the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC). Governor Cándia's interest in controlling the new state Liga led to a new struggle for power with Graciano Sánchez and his Tlaxcalan followers. Graciano Sánchez wanted one of his loyal officers of the Tlaxcalan CCM branch as the leader of the state Liga which was to be founded. His choice, Ricardo Altamirano, left no doubt as to his intentions to use his own group of Tlaxcalan CCM leaders -including Guadalupe León -as an operational basis for organizing the new state Liga. Cándia tried to prevent Altamirano's nomination, but Graciano Sánchez' position had meanwhile become stronger. (He was to be the first secretary general of the national CNC). Cándia had to accept the nomination of Altamirano, but he immediately started to sabotage the organizational work of the Liga. In his struggle with Altamirano and Graciano Sánchez the governor could probably count on a number of allies who tried to compete with the Liga in obtaining or maintaining control over the peasants, disliked the possible influence of a new organization outside their control and even more the idea of relinquishing their control to a Liga única. As a consequence Altamirano's Liga had to counter persistent interventions in peasant organization and control by the state executive committee of the PNR dominated by Cándia supporters -Carrizosa among them -, competing labour organizations like Lombardo Toledano's recently founded CTM and the still powerfull CROM. Worse still, he had to face local level powerholders who, like Carrizosa, had hitherto succeeded in controlling the electoral or organizational potential of "their" peasants 73 .
ever, and had to order "his" peasant representatives to attend the founding congress of the Liga a few weeks later. Nevertheless Carrizosa firmly intended to control Liga activities in his district from the moment Altamirano decided to establish a regional Liga committee in Huamantla, and tried to propose Liga candidates for the municipal committees of the PNR 74 .
In 1938 the conflict intensified, The remodelling of the PNR in the sectorial organization of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), provoked fierce competition between its separate peasant-, industrial workers-, military and popular sector (consisting mainly of government employees) in claiming party candidates for legislative and executive positions. In the spring of 1938 the composition of the provisional state and municipal PRM committees reflected already an incipient trend towards a dominant position of the popular sector. The trend became quite clear during the electoral campaign for municipal counsellors and deputies to the State Congress in the autumn of that year. State PRM leadership was dominated by non-peasant interests. Peasant representatives in the state PRM executive committee and Liga leader Altamirano were forced to accept the decision that the peasant sector could only nominate candidates for two out of seven seats in the State Congress. Moreover, the state executive committee decided to propose candidates for the peasant sector who, in fact, were neither peasants nor partisans of Altamirano and his Liguistas. The anti-i/guisto-faction in the PRM state committee tried to maintain control over the electoral process by appointing only non-Liguista delegates for the collection of the peasant vote and keeping the Liguistas uninformed. When Altamirano, León and others found out they protested in Mexico and tried to collect their own peasant vote, provoking serious conflicts with local authorities. Huamantla became a major focus in this conflict and for good reasons. First of all, the 7th electoral district (Juárez) had been designated for the nomination of a peasant candidate. Secondly, Carrizosa being one of the dominant antiLiguistas in the state PRM committee, intended to have his influential nonpeasant friend of landowner origin Rafael Avila Bretón launched as the peasant candidate for deputy, and to keep Liguistas out of the proposed planillas for municipal counsellors 75 .
74 ) Programme and invitations were ready to be distributed, but the invited representatives now showed up at the Liga congress, see Col. Carr. and interviews Carrizosa, aprii 1968; Altamirano, Tlax., to Pdte. CEN. PNR. Mexico, 8. 11. 1937 The Liguistas, under regional committee president Agustín Valencia, fought back, thereby taking advantage of Carrizosa's inability to cope with the mounting problems in land reform such as the distribution of e/itfo-plots and the dismissal of peones who flocked to the town of Huamantla, asking for land and a place to live in. Liguistas and Carrizosa's friends started a fierce competition in coaching and controlling initiatives to ask for more ejidos. When the Comisariado ejidal under Antonio Aquino Daza quickly organized a new executive agrarian committee supported by Carrizosa and the municipal authorities, Celestino Flores, a Liguista spokesman of the landless labourers who had recently flocked to Huamantla, tried to intervene in the procedures and accused the Comisariado ejidal of fraudulent distribution of ejido-plots and of rigging the census of prospective ejidatarios. Carrizosa complained about the Liguistas' electoral motives, especially when it became clear that Agustín Valencia was to be launched as a competing peasant candidate in the Juárez district supported by the Liga and a group of peasant leaders from a.o. Huamantla, Batán, Ranchería Jesús and Citlaltepetl. In view of mounting opposition Carrizosa and his friends decided to compromise on the issue of the PRM candidate for the peasant sector and proposed a new candidate, this time of peasant origin, who had been the president of the -Carrizosa dominated -executive agrarian committee of Huamantla in 1936. At the same time they tried to prevent further Liguista interference with the municipal elections and e/icfo-administration by an efficient campaign of intimidation. As far as the elections are concerned, the Liguistas failed in their objectives and some of the "independent" delegates sent by the PRM from Mexico on urgent request of Altamirano, ended up in jail 74 . Regarding the complaints on e/ùfo-adminis- While landless Huamantlaco peasants saw their prospects for land gradually declining to zero -after january 1940 only a few hectares were distributed -Carrizosa and his friends were able to consolidate their local powerdomains and move upward in hierarchy. After his political defeat Altamirano left Tlaxcala for a position in the executive committee of the federal C.N.C., where he continued to fight his Tlaxcalan enemies, be it only for a short while. When his mentor Graciano Sánchez lost his powerful position and control over the C.N.C, after 1940, the Tlaxcalan Liga too lost its opposing vigour and Altamirano finally sided with Carrizosa.
After aiding Rafael Avila Bretón to become a senator (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) 
Conclusions
During the nineteen thirties the Mexican political system was in the transition of what has been called caudillismo revolucionario to a stronger presidential system 81 . Like many other politicians Carrizosa was not only able to grasp the unique possibilities for political mobility and accomodation offered during this process of political modernization, but he also succeeded in evading the pittfalls caused by diminishing autonomy of regional and local power domains. From 1933 onwards Carrizosa attempted to control the electoral and organizational potential of a peasantry for a group of influential local politicians and regional power holders. In his attempts to control this peasantry he clearly showed some of the qualities of caudillo type leaders: their, as Wolf and Hansen called it, "access vision": The ability to find out where political or other profit can be obtained, and their tendency towards exclusive control based on clientage systems and readiness to impose or to use some sort of violence 82 offered the peasants' electoral and organizational potential to politicians who aspired to congressional or gubernatorial positions in exchange for his own accomodation among the hombres de confianza, the trusted friends of the incumbent. By 1940 Carrizosa had succeeded in accomodating himself firmly within the framework of regional power in Tlaxcala and several of his most loyal clients of peasant origin had been able to move upward in the hierarchy. Moreover, during the process Carrizosa seemed to have been able to create a large peasant following, without alienating some of his politically influential Huamantlaco friends of landowners' origin. There is little doubt about his attempts to control mobilization of peasants, but the question remains if he really created a clientage system in the process or just imposed himself?
Carrizosa started his career in Huamantla, recognizing on the one hand the growing awareness among acasillados of their constitutional rights regarding land and labour, and on the other hand the still prevailing difficulties in having these rights implemented. Moreover, the rather limited interests of his patrons and friends in peasants' problems must have been clear to him from the beginning. Therefore, it seems that his original clientage consisted rather of representatives of "little haves" or those who were likely to obtain ejidos. Executive agrarian committees of the town of Huamantla and smallholder villages were clearly éntitled to present petitions and, together with the already existing comisariados ejidales, needed continuous advice and support in obtaining access to the state or federal bureaucracy for solving their problems. However, state and federal level election campaigns, and growing but conflicting interests in peasant organization induced Carrizosa to continuous mobilization of the electoral and organizational potential of the "have nots", the acasillados on the haciendas. He presented himself as an agrarian intermediary, for the time being, however, with only small results for his petitioning peasants. Around 1935 Carrizosa's relations with the great majority of the acasillados he tried to mobilize could barely be defined as clientelisi, since their hope for favours was equalled by mounting desillusion and fear for punishment by landlords.
From 1935 onwards, however, the federal government not only intended to foster but also to control the attempts to mobilize the Mexican peasantry. Since many thousands of peasants obtained land or better labour conditions during the years of the Cardenista campaign for mobilizing the organizational and electoral potential of the Mexican peasantry under government control, the term clientelisi seems appropriate, at least for the relationship between the federal government and parts of the peasantry. When these changing policies regarding the peasant sector began to reach the state and local level, they not only imposed a centralized organizational framework on peasant mobilization, but also offered unique possibilities to ambituous local politicians for posing as successful agrarian intermediaries. Local politicians soon found out that they could be pretty sure of the output of their interventions on behalf of the peasant clients, even if the intervention had been a merely ritual one. As a consequence, especially the peasantries who had been hitherto deprived of the benefits of the Revolution became attractive as prospective clients, when the old hacendado class was likely to lose its properties and prestige. During the Cárdenas years success in keeping competing mobilizers out of a domain and controlling the peasants' electoral and organizational potential implied the possibility to offer this strategic power capability to competing regional or national interests in peasant mobilization, in exchange for political mobility and accomodation. Since the federal government saw to the implementation of land reform and labour policies, for ambituous rural politicians the crucial question seemed to be how to keep competing mobilizers out of their domain rather than how to maintain a peasant clientele by effectively promoting their interests. In this respect Carrizosa's attempts at peasant mobilization during the heydays of agrarian reform were unlikely to be of a less controlled character than they were in earlier years. Carrizosa succeeded in keeping competitors out of his domain and tried to bind those peasants who were most likely to be favoured by federal agrarian or labour policies. Although he intervened on behalf of peasants, he often only had to wait for the federal "push". Moreover, it is hardly conceivable that a substantial number of acasillados would have been deprived of land-grants if Carrizosa and his friends had not been in local power during the Cárdenas years. However, since the granted ejidos often were not enough to cover the necessities of all the landless peasants involved, in such a case it could have been possible that other groups of acasillados on the same haciendas or in the town would have profited from the granted ejidos. Therefore, imminent scarcity of ejidoplots, leading to inter peasant rivalry, may have been a major factor in binding peasants to Carrizosa, especially during the heydays of agrarian reform. Next to this following based on the fear of losing an ejido-plot or the hope to obtain one in time, one may assume that Carrizosa indeed had created a limited group of clients in the real sense: those local Carrizosista peasant leaders who not only had obtained e/Wo-plots, but also a derivative power domain based on comisariados ejidales and municipal or party positions. This group of clients constituted the basis of Carrizosa's power domain for the years to come.
